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Introduction
T he ex isten ce  o f  the bitsphere enables an unprecedented acceleration o f  the 
deconstruction o f  traditional work patterns. W hen people no longer work together  
in the sam e p lace - the shop floor, the typing p ool, the w arehouse or the factory - 
opportunities for socia l interactions, for social learning and com m unity building  
disappear, just as the im plicit learning opportunities in the classroom  can vanish  
w hen the cohesion  o f  learning in a group is eclipsed  by the device-assisted , 
ind ividually-paced  acquisition o f  know ledge. But where, i f  not in school and  
workplace, is society built and changed?'
In The Real World o f  Technology, Ursula Franklin confronted the challenge of 
technology for the twenty-first century. For Franklin, the idea of technology as 
practice , a way o f organizing work and people, represents more than new electronic 
or mechanical inventions. It is how new ways of doing things shape human 
relationships and the social and political organization o f global communities. In this 
context, she suggested that many recent developments in technology represent 
profound, even violent, transformations of our human society. Significantly for 
lawyers, Franklin focused on the practice o f  justice as a way of confronting these 
challenges of technological change. She argued that nothing short o f a global 
reformation of major social forces can now provide security for the world and its 
citizens, a process which requires lawyers’ expertise and imagination in rethinking 
the concept o f justice:
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[Emphasis added].
Such a d evelop m en t w ill require the redefin ition o f  rights and responsibilities, and 
the setting o f  lim its to p ow er and control. There have to be com pletely  different 
criteria for w hat is  perm issible and w hat is not. Central to  any new  order that can 
shape and direct tech n o logy  and human destiny w ill be a renew ed em phasis on the  
concept o f  ju stice . T he v iab ility  o f  tech n ology , like dem ocracy, depends in the end  
on the p rac tice  o f  ju stice  and on the enforcem ent o f  lim its to pow er.2
Although Franklin did not confine her ideas about the practice o f justice to 
members o f the legal profession, her comments seem to require that legal educators 
take a hard look at current arrangements for legal education. To what extent can 
legal education resist the demands of the market which appear to have captured the 
ethos o f legal practice (if not all o f those who are legal practitioners)? Do legal 
educators have tools and strategies with which to challenge dominant ideologies of 
corporate agendas? Do law teachers have a responsibility to support voices that 
resist defining the world primarily in terms o f the market pressures o f globalization?
Taking seriously Ursula Franklin’s rhetorical question: “where, i f  not in school 
and workplace, is society built and changed?” means that we need to focus on both 
undergraduate law teaching as well as continuing legal education in lawyers ’ 
workplaces. This latter focus is particularly important because, at least in Canada, 
continuing legal education has more often been shaped by the relatively narrow, 
doctrinal needs o f practitioners -  with little sense o f the larger framework within 
which they work. As Deborah Rhode recently suggested in the American context, 
“Lawyers [increasingly] know more and more about less and less, and their 
intellectual horizons have correspondingly narrowed... [with many lawyers finding] 
too much o f their work dispiritingly dull or relentlessly repetitious.”3
2 Ibid. at 5 [Emphasis added], Franklin explicitly connected her ideas about technology to those o f
C.B.Macpherson about democracy:
Technology, like democracy, includes ideas and practices; it includes myths and various 
models o f  reality. And like democracy, technology changes the social and individual 
relationships between us. It has forced us to examine and redefine our notions o f  power and 
o f  accountability.
Ibid. at 2.
3 D. L. Rhode, In the Interests o f  Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) at 29:
While innovative technology has eliminated some o f  the most tedious tasks, it has imposed 
new burdens and constraints. In many high-volume practices, lawyers’ services need to fit 
within limited time frames and standardized programs, which narrows opportunities for
Franklin’s critique o f the new world of technology provides the context for some 
reflections in this paper about innovative educational programmes concerning 
gender equality goals, one of which I designed for large law firms in Toronto over 
a period of several years in the late 1990s.4 The paper begins with a brief 
examination o f the literature about gender, law and justice, focusing especially on 
the 1993 recommendations o f a task force established by the Canadian Bar 
Association to promote greater gender equality in the law and the legal profession 
in Canada.5 One recommendation suggested that law firms should engage in 
seminars about issues o f gender equality, and as a result, I was requested to design 
and implement a series of seminars for three of the largest law firms in Toronto 
between 1994 and 1997.6 Franklin’s insights seem especially relevant to an 
assessment of the tensions which lawyers experience between increasingly excessive 
work demands and firm s’ stated goals o f gender equality in their practices and 
culture. In the context o f the narrowing of lawyers’ work and the challenge to 
promote equality goals in the legal profession, there are profound implications for 
the practice o f  justice.
Gender Equality and the Legal Profession
intellectual challenge and personal problem-solving.... As the pace o f communication 
accelerates, the pressures o f practice intensify. Legal life lurches from deadline to deadline, 
and in some fields, unpredictable and oppressive demands are disturbingly predictable....
4 This paper is part o f a larger project, examining both historical and contemporary contexts for women 
lawyers, which seeks to map the intersection between the entry o f women to the legal profession and 
related developments in social equality movements and in the “formation" o f professional culture in law. 
For an earlier examination o f  these relationships, see M.J. Mossman “The Paradox o f  Feminist 
Engagement with Law” in N. Mandell, ed., Feminist Issues: Race, Class and Sexuality, 2nd ed. 
(Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon, 1998) 180.
5 Canadian Bar Association, Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity, Accountability (Ottawa: 
Canadian Bar Asssociation, 1993) [hereinafter Touchstones]. The CBA Task Force was chaired by 
former Justice Bertha Wilson o f the Supreme Court o f Canada.
6 In earlier writing, I have also focused on the special pedagogical challenges involved in such 
educational programming, and the need for problem-solving approaches quite different from most forms 
o f  continuing education for lawyers: see M.J. Mossman, “Engendering the Legal Profession: the 
Education Strategy” in U. Schultz & G. Shaw, eds., Women in the World's Legal Professions (Oxford: 
Hart, 2002) forthcoming; and M.J. Mossman, “Gender Equality Education and the Legal Profession” 
(2000) 12 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 187.
Women have been becoming lawyers in Canada for more than a century.7 Yet, until 
relatively recently, women have represented only a tiny minority of lawyers and an 
even smaller number within the judiciary,8 a pattern which is similar to the trends in 
other western jurisdictions. As a result, there has been a noticeable increase in 
scholarly attention to women’s entry to the legal profession, both monitoring the rate 
o f this changing demography and attempting to assess its potential to change the 
profession’s traditional (male) culture.9 Thus, in the 1990s, legal scholars in a 
number o f jurisdictions examined the impact o f gender on law and the legal 
profession.10 For example, in her theoretical analysis o f women lawyers in Australia,
7 For an excellent overview, see F. Kay & J. Brockman, “Barriers to Gender Equality in the Canadian 
Legal Establishment” (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Issues 169. For an overview o f the experiences o f  the 
first women lawyers in Canada and in some other jurisdictions, see also M.J. Mossman, “Portia’s 
Progress: Women as Lawyers, Reflections on Past and Future” (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Jus. 252.
8 Supra note 5 at 48-50. For example, in British Columbia, only 3.2% o f members o f the Law Society 
were women in 1971, but they represented 21.1% o f  members in 1990; while in Ontario, 83% of  
practising women lawyers, compared to 42% o f  male lawyers, had been called to the bar in the previous 
decade. Statistics assembled by the CBA task force indicated that the percentage o f women members 
o f  the legal profession increased dramatically in all parts o f  Canada after 1970. By 1993, the task force 
report stated that women lawyers comprised 27% o f  the practising profession, although only 12% of 
federally-appointed judges; the report also concluded that women were generally under-represented in 
private practice and over-represented among those employed in government. See also Kay & Brockman, 
supra note 7; and S. Boyd, E. Sheehy & J. Bouchard, eds., “Canadian Feminist Perspectives on Law: 
An Annotated Bibliography o f Interdisciplinary Writings” (1999) 11 C.J.W.L.
9 For example, in her comparative essay about women lawyers in several different countries around the 
world, Carrie Menkel-Meadow confirmed the trend o f  increasing numbers o f  women lawyers almost 
everywhere in the world. However, she also posed a question about the meaning o f  increased numbers 
o f women lawyers, suggesting that whether women will be changed by the legal profession, or whether 
the legal profession will be changed by the increased presence o f women is a different - and more 
important - question. C. Menkel-Meadow, “The Comparative Sociology o f Women Lawyers: The 
‘Feminization’ o f  the Legal Profession” (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 897; Menkel-Meadow also 
explored these issues in R. Abel & P. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories, vol. 3 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1989), where her research relied on reports prepared for the 
legal profession project in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Scotland, New Zealand, 
Belgium, Germany, Norway, France, Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Venezuela, Japan and India. The 
national report prepared for Canada provided only a few paragraphs, however, about gender issues: see 
H. Arthurs, F. Zemans & R. Weisman, “Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism” in Abel & 
Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: the Common Law World, (Berkeley: University o f  California Press,
1988) vol. 1. For an early study o f  the stratification o f  the Ontario legal profession, see B. Adam & K. 
Lahey “Professional Opportunities: A Survey o f the Ontario Legal Profession” ( 1981 ) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 
674.
10 In the United Kingdom, Clare McGlynn’s 1998 study o f  women members o f  the legal profession 
documented the barriers and opportunities which continue to exist, as well as women’s perseverence and 
optimism as revealed in personal stories o f  their experiences in academe, and as solicitors, barristers and 
judges. McGlynn also argued that it is necessary to connect the concerns and struggles o f these
Margaret Thornton focused on the reality o f legal work and examined how it posed 
formidable barriers to the achievement o f gender equality goals. As she argued, in 
spite o f the increasing number of women in the legal profession, women continued 
to be only “fringe-dwellers o f the jurisprudential community.”11 Thornton’s 
conclusions were reinforced by research in the United States12 and in Canada,13 and
individual women lawyers to broader, institutional arrangements: “the economic structure o f the firm 
and the legal profession, the nature o f the law and legal culture, [and ...] the fact that women as a whole 
are disadvantaged in society as well as in the legal academy and profession”-  C. McGlynn, The Woman 
Lawyer: Making a Difference (London: Butterworths, 1998) at 3. In the United Kingdom, see also H. 
Sommerlad & P. Sanderson, Gender, Choice and Commitment: Women Solicitors in England and Wales 
and the Struggle for Equal Status (Aldershot: Ashcroft/Dartmouth, 1998); and S. Fredman, Women and 
the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). In the United States, see M. Harrington, Women Lawyers: 
Rewriting the Rules (New York: Plume, 1994); and for earlier studies, C. Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 
(New York: Basic Books, 1981 ), and 2nd ed. (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1993); and R. Moss 
Kanter, “Reflections on Women and the Legal Profession: A Sociological Perspective” ( 1978) 1 Harv. 
Women’s L.J. 1.
11 M. Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Sydney: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) at 3-4. Thornton concluded that “neither an increase in the number o f women nor the 
passing o f  time can provide an automatic remedy.” In such a context, she suggested that women who 
“make it in a man’s world” can do so only by assimilating the traditional (male) characteristics o f the 
profession. In terms o f  effecting goals o f  gender equality, “there is nothing potentially radical about 
such women because they do not wish to change any aspect o f  legal practice as it is. . .;” moreover, 
according to Thornton, conformity on the part o f  some women lawyers to the traditional culture o f the 
profession confirms for many that gender is not an issue, a conclusion which absolves the profession 
from taking any initiatives which might further gender equality goals. See Thornton, at 290-91.
12 For example, see B. Lentz & D. Laband, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession (Westport, Conn: 
Quorum Books, 1995). In their 1995 study o f thousands o f responses to the National Survey o f  Career 
Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction administered by the American Bar Association in 1984 and again in 1990, 
the authors concluded (in relation to pay and promotion criteria) that there was little overt discrimination 
against women lawyers in the United States, a finding which they acknowledged to be different from 
the conclusions o f  some other studies. However, they also asserted that differences in rates o f pay or 
promotion would be “relatively easy to prove in a court o f  law,” thus making these forms of  
discrimination risky. Instead, Lentz and Laband argued at xvi-xix that forms o f discriminatory 
behaviour against women lawyers were much more subtle and covert, making them harder to identify 
and challenge:
Relative to comparable men lawyers, women lawyers report a sense o f  powerlessness in the 
workplace, and they do not believe that their performance is evaluated on the basis o f merit.... 
[Female] lawyers apparently experience subtle discrimination on margins that are not easily 
provable in a court o f law.... Given that those women who are most knowledgeable about 
their rights suffer multidimensional discrimination, the effectiveness o f existing civil rights 
law is called into question.
13 J. Brockman, Gender in the Legal Profession: Fitting in or Breaking the Mould (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2001) at 200:
many o f these studies about women members o f the legal profession recognized, at 
least to some extent, the broader context o f changes within the profession, some of 
which may exacerbate women’s opportunities as lawyers.14 Both in Thornton’s 
study o f Australian women lawyers,15 and in the Canadian longitudinal study of 
Toronto law firms undertaken by sociologists John Hagan and Fiona Kay in the early 
1990s,16 for example, the conjunction of major organizational change in the 
profession with the increasing representation o f women lawyers was addressed 
specifically. In their study, Hagan and Kay concluded that the profession of law had 
become “a contested domain” by the end o f the 1980s, with increased opportunities 
at the entry-level for both male and female lawyers but a shrinking proportion of 
partnership opportunities: a “glass ceiling” which “became an increasing reality for 
women but also for men”:
Discrimination in the legal profession can come from a variety o f  sources.... [Some] men will 
discriminate against women simply because they are women. Although there was no measure 
o f this in this study, the proportion o f men who fell into this category seems to be small. Most 
o f them are identified as belonging to the “old boys’club,” and are thought to be becoming 
relics o f  the past. However, according to some respondents, “baby dinosaurs” are growing 
up to replace them. Some women in this study sacrificed their personal lives and sold their 
souls to their law firms in order to become partners. They were being let go with glowing 
recommendations, rather than being invited into partnerships. The men who were poised for 
partnership, on the other hand, saw little standing in their way. It is difficult to conclude that 
the legal profession has rid itself o f  discrimination.
Brockman’s study is important because it takes account o f  links between gender equality in the legal 
profession and in the broader society, and because it recognizes how personal “choices” on the part o f  
women lawyers must be understood within a social context. For British and American analyses o f  the 
issue o f  choice, see Sommerlad & Sanderson, supra note 10; J. Williams, “Gender Wars: Selfless Women 
in the Republic o f  Choice” (1991) 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1559; and J. Williams, Unbending Gender: Why 
Family and Work Conflict and What to do About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
14 To some extent, emerging literature about critical changes in the nature and processes o f  legal work 
has tended to exist in isolation from much o f  the literature about women lawyers (and other recent 
entrants to the profession): a kind o f  “two solitudes” in critical legal scholarship. For example, see R. 
L. Nelson, D. M. Trubek,& R. L. Solomon, eds.. Lawyers ’Ideals/Lawyers 'Practices: Transformations 
in the American Legal Profession (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); J. P. Heinz, E.O. Laumann, 
R. L. N elson,& E. Michelson, “The Changing Character o f  Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995" 
(1998) 32:4 Law & Soc’y. Rev. 751; G. Hanlon, Lawyers, the State and the Market: Professionalism 
Revisited (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1999); J. Flood, “Megalawyering in the Global Order: the 
Cultural, Social and Economic Transformation o f  Legal Practice” ( 1996) 3:1/2 International Journal o f  
the Legal Profession 169; and H. Sommerlad, “Managerialism and the Legal Profession: A New  
Professional Paradigm” (1995) 2:2/3 International Journal o f  the Legal Profession 159.
15 Supra note 11.
16 J. Hagan & F. Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study o f  Lawyers ’ Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995).
The practice o f law became much more highly centralized and concentrated in large 
firms during the 1970s and 1980s.... [The growth rate o f lawyers accelerated in 
private firms, government and business, but it also] involved, in relative terms, a 
shrinking pool o f centralized and concentrated partnerships in large firms, with 
increasing numbers o f lawyers in intermediate and lower positions. In short, this 
was a period o f growth with a ceiling on upward outcomes.... Although the actual 
numbers o f women and men lawyers at partnership levels o f these firms increased 
in absolute terms during this period, their relative shares o f partnership positions 
declined, and this ceiling effect was more pronounced for women than for men. 
During this period, men and women were developing careers in a legal profession 
whose parameters were changing in ways that traditional conceptions o f professional 
autonomy would not predict.17
According to the data in the study conducted by Hagan and Kay, even when 
women invested in their careers to the same extent as men, women lawyers were not 
rewarded at levels comparable to male lawyers; thus, explanations for women 
lawyers’ relative disadvantage in the profession based on “different choices” were 
rendered unpersuasive.18 Instead, they argued that gender stratification theory, an 
explanation focusing on the structural constraints o f law practice and legal culture, 
and the extent to which they impose constraints on women lawyers’ choices, was 
more persuasive. Their focus on a more structural approach shifts attention “away 
from employees in order to focus on employers who are the source o f many of their 
problems.”19 As is evident, these recommendations do not focus primarily on the
17 Ibid. at 181-182. Hagan and K a y ’s study offers a careful analysis o f  competing explanations for the
differing experiences o f  men and women who are lawyers. In particular, they examined the explanation 
that gendered experiences among lawyers occur primarily as a result o f different choices being made by 
men and women about their careers in the legal profession. According to this explanation, women 
lawyers who experience a relative lack o f  career progress have made “choices” to invest less in their 
careers than in their families, by contrast with male lawyers. Significantly, this explanation for the 
different experiences o f  men and women lawyers assigns responsibility for choices to individual lawyers
- if  women lawyers wish to succeed, it is simply a matter o f them behaving more like men in the legal 
profession. According to this theory, women lawyers bear individual responsibility for improving their 
career options; there is no need for the profession itself to change. Sommerlad and Sanderson also 
provide a sustained critique o f  the explanation o f “choice” in relation to differing gendered experiences 
in the practice o f  law: see supra note 10, especially at 27 ff.
18 Supra note 16 at 187-88.
19 Ibid. at 196. Using this approach, Hagan and Kay recommended the adoption o f  broadly-based 
initiatives, including systematic tracking o f  firms’ partnership decisions; tax incentives and other 
governmental policies to create more workplace flexibility; support from professional associations in 
designing ways to minimize work/family conflicts; education and prevention programmes; and the 
development o f innovative model policies by law societies: ibid. at 198-203. See also K. Hull & R.
“choices” o f individual lawyers, but rather on systemic change in the practices o f law 
firms and other legal institutions.
Yet, although Hagan and Kay, like other scholars o f the legal profession, have 
suggested a need for change in the legal profession, it is less clear exactly how these 
necessary changes will occur. Particularly if appropriate changes depend on the 
intervention o f firm managers, law societies, or other professional associations, it 
will be necessary to convince them o f the long term benefits o f gender equality 
initiatives, including employer self-interest in retaining women lawyers.20 
Significantly, Hagan and Kay recommended education programmes for firms and 
other legal employers regarding the nature and consequences of gender inequality 
for the profession. This focus on education as a strategy for achieving gender 
equality goals in the legal profession was similarly reflected in the recommendations 
of the Canadian Bar Association’s 1993 report21 -  recommendations which became 
the catalyst for my seminars for Toronto law firms in the late 1990s.
The 1993 CBA Recommendations and Gender Equality Education Programmes
The CBA task force recognized that its report was being presented in a context of 
significant change in the structure and organization of legal work in Canada, and 
elsewhere.22 Indeed, one o f the most interesting features of the report is its
Nelson, “Gender Inequality in Law: Problems o f Structure and Agency in Recent Studies o f Gender in 
Anglo-American Legal Professions” (1998) 23:3 Law & Soc. Inquiry 681. Moreover, according to 
Deborah Rhode:
By choice or necessity, many lawyers with noncompetitive orientations or strong 
commitments to family or nonprofit pursuits drift out o f  [large] firm hierarchies, leaving 
management composed largely o f  those who accept revenue-maximizing priorities. That 
selection process perpetuates a culture well insulated from alternative values.
See D.L. Rhode, “Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice” (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, at 634.
20 Such strategies may be problematic in the long term; for an analysis in the UK, see C. McGlynn, 
“Strategies for Reforming the English Solicitors’ Profession: An Analysis o f  the Business Case for Sex 
Equality” in U. Schultz & G. Shaw, eds., Women in the World’s Legal Professions (Oxford: Hart, 2002) 
forthcoming.
21 Hagan and Kay were also involved in research for the Touchstones report, supra note 5: see Kay and 
Hagan “The Structural Dynamics o f the Law Firm” (Appendix 13 o f  Touchstones). John Hagan was also 
a member o f  the CBA task force which produced the Touchstones report.
22 At the outset, the report focused on the motivations for change in the legal profession in relation to 
goals o f gender equality; one motivation identified was the need for “enlightened self-interest and 
accountability o f the profession”: supra note 5 at 17-19.
characterization of the challenge of gender equality in the legal profession as an 
integral part o f the re-shaping of the profession. For example, in the introductory 
comments o f the task force chair, former Justice Bertha Wilson, the problem was 
presented as one about identity for members of the legal profession in relation to 
these new developments:
[The entry o f women to the legal profession] “shook up” the profession and men as 
well as women were forced to confront issues to which they had never given really 
serious thought before.... Lawyers realized that this was a time for moral and 
intellectual stocktaking, for taking a cold dispassionate look at where their 
profession was going. How was their profession faring in the larger context of 
society? Was it a profession they were proud to belong to? Or had it become a little 
tarnished over the years? Had it, as some suggested, become “too commercialized”? 
Were people now in it for the money? Were we still the moral and intellectual 
leaders in our communities or were we just high-priced technicians at the beck and 
call o f the corporate elite? In sum, did the profession still warrant the description 
“noble and learned”?23
Although phrased rhetorically, Justice Wilson’s questions clearly characterized 
goals o f gender equality as part o f an overall professional commitment to justice;24
23 Supra note 5 at 1.
24 The relationship between goals o f  gender equality and an overall professional commitment to justice 
were evident, for example, in her endorsement o f the views o f two American authors who asked:
What is a reasonable response to the fact that large numbers o f people entering law find basic 
incompatibility with the [lawyer’s] role? One attorney suggests, “if  you can’t stand the heat, 
get out o f the kitchen.” A more thoughtful reply would be to ask what is wrong with the 
kitchen that so many bright, competent people find it difficult to work there? What happens 
i f  people work all day in a kitchen that is too hot?... What [can] we learn about the legal 
system and about the possible changes which need to be made?
Supra note 5 at 268; quoting D. Jack & R. Jack, “Women Lawyers: Archetypes and Altematives”in C. 
Gilligan, J. V. Ward & J. McLean Taylor et al., eds., Mapping the Moral Domain (Boston: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). The Touchstones report systematically examined current policies and practices 
affecting women lawyers in private law firms and also in government, academe, administrative tribunals 
and the judiciary, and made a long list o f recommendations (some quite controversial) which were 
subsequently considered in public discussions by the National Council o f  the Canadian Bar Association. 
In spite o f  the dramatic rate o f increase for women members o f  the legal profession, the CBA’s 1993 
report concluded that there had been all too little change in the legal profession in relation to the 
reception o f  women lawyers:
The dimensions o f  the problems experienced by women in the legal profession are staggering.
for her, lawyers have independent responsibilities to promote justice, not merely 
their (corporate) clients’ interests. Although not everyone would agree with this 
characterization o f the challenge, there was no ambiguity about the nature o f the 
professional values adopted by the CBA report. For Justice Wilson and the CBA 
task force, ideas about justice were fundamental to concepts of lawyering. Thus, 
Touchstones suggested that any transformation of the profession25 would require 
change at a number of different levels: “behaviours, attitudes, institutional policies 
and practices, and in the structure of the profession itself.”26 Accordingly, the report 
concluded that the process o f change would require the profession to question the 
way that law is practised as well as the profession’s assumptions underlying the 
status quo.27 And significantly, the report identified “education about the nature of 
gender inequality in the legal profession [as] crucial”:
What is needed for the legal profession is “remedial human rights jurisprudence”
In a country where gender equality is entrenched as a primary constitutional value, and in a 
self-governing profession knowledgeable about law and concerned with justice, women 
continue to be discriminated against in numerous overt and covert ways.
Supra note 5 at 10. Although a number o f provincial law societies sponsored similar studies during the 
same period, the national scope o f  the CBA study and its process o f consultation over several years made 
it a primary focus o f discussion for both the legal profession and the public on issues about gender 
equality in Canadian law. For other examples, see Law Society o f British Columbia, Women in the 
Legal Profession: A Report o f  the Women in the Legal Profession Subcommittee (Vancouver: The Law 
Society, 1991 ); Law Society o f  British Columbia, Gender Equality in the Justice System: A Report o f  
the Law Society o f  British Columbia Gender Bias Committee (Vancouver: The Law Society, 1992); and 
F. Kay, Transitions in the Ontario Legal Profession: A Survey o f  Lawyers Called to the Bar Between 
1975-1990 (A report to the Law Society o f Upper Canada, Osgoode Hall, Toronto: 1991 ). A number 
o f provincial reports were also prepared as part o f the research for Touchstones', see Appendices.
25 Only in the last chapter o f  the report was there a concerted effort to assess the problems and 
possibilities o f achieving fundamental institutional change. In chapter fifteen, the report identified the 
reform challenge as “momentous,” and recognized a need for both individual and institutional change 
to achieve gender equality objectives for lawyers. Moreover, the report recognized that change might 
not occur all at once, advocating that “incremental change [was] possible and necessary.” Just as 
significantly, Touchstones identified some o f the points o f resistance to proposed changes to achieve 
gender equality goals, including the “myth” that progress is being made already; the harsh economic 
climate; issues o f reverse discrimination; complacency and “a consensus o f denial;” ideas about the 
proper role for women; and problems o f backlash that silence legitimate complaints. Supra note 5 at 
267-271.
^ Supra note 5 at 271.
11 Ibid. For another assessment o f the problems o f the status quo for law and lawyers, see M.J. Mossman, 
“Gender Equality and the Canadian Charter. Making Rights Work for Women?” in P. Smith, ed., 
Making Rights Work (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1999).
accessible to non-specialists....These messages should be repeated until they form 
the basis o f a common understanding o f our legal duties to our colleagues in the 
profession and beyond....We must develop a culture o f “problem-solving” for our 
own profession. Lawyers are trained to criticize and demolish arguments. In order 
to achieve gender equality, we must learn how to find creative solutions for our own 
internal problems.28
This “education strategy” promoted by Touchstones needs to be examined 
carefully. In the first place, the report’s emphasis on education as a strategy for 
accomplishing institutional change in the legal profession in relation to gender 
equality goals suggested that current problems o f gender inequality in the profession 
are mainly the result o f a lack of knowledge; as a result, Touchstones assumed that 
the provision of knowledge through education would engender appropriate changes. 
In this way, education about gender equality becomes a means to an end, a process 
that is somehow separate from issues o f power, economic resources, or human will 
within the profession. Second, the emphasis on education appeared to assume that 
it is possible to provide information about the jurisprudence on gender equality 
which will per se engender new and different practices within the profession, as if 
education about gender equality were no different from information about new 
legislative amendments which regularly have to be incorporated into legal practice. 
This approach tends to underestimate the power of entrenched ideas about gender 
roles in the profession, and in the larger society.29 As well, the report’s emphasis on 
education to remedy gender inequality overlooked the extent to which these 
challenges within the profession might require fundamental re-structuring of 
institutions as well as profound changes in individual attitudes and behaviours. At 
the very least, such goals would require highly specialized education.
In spite o f these potential limitations, three Toronto firms responded to the 
Touchstones recommendations and took up the challenge o f my education seminars 
about gender equality for several years after 1993.30 As a result, the seminar 
experiment provided an interesting opportunity to examine the usefulness of an 
educational initiative in the context o f legal practice demands. Equally significantly,
28 Supra note 5 at 271 -272.
*9 For one analysis, see M.J. Mossman, “Gender Issues in Teaching Methods: Reflections on Shifting 
the Paradigm” (1995) 6:2 Legal Educ. Rev. 129. In the United States, see R. Nelson & W.P. Bridges, 
Legalizing Gender Inequality: Courts, Markets, and Unequal Pay for Women in America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
30 The seminars were provided on a confidential basis; thus, no identifying information is available.
it offered an occasion to reflect on the extent to which the task force report could be 
characterized as an important “voice o f resistance” within the legal profession, and 
whether its recommendation for continuing education for lawyers provided useful 
insights about processes o f change, especially in the context o f Franklin’s concept 
o f the practice o f justice.31
In assessing the seminars, and the role of education generally as a strategy for 
change, a number o f constraints can be easily identified. For example, a one-time- 
only seminar of two and one-half hours is unlikely to accomplish more than an 
introduction to the issues and problems, especially in the context o f education about 
gender equality, where ideas may challenge longstanding attitudes, traditional and 
well-established practices, and stereotypical views about gender roles. Indeed, 
gender equality programmes which go beyond merely providing information to 
challenge fundamental values, attitudes and behaviour require time for reflection and 
further discussion, a commodity all too rare in the environment of most large law 
firms. By contrast, as I conducted these relatively unique educational programmes 
for law firms over a number o f years, the reality of workplace demands for lawyers 
in these firms meant that the gender equality education programme frequently had
31 Even though all o f the firms had well-established programmes for continuing legal education, they 
approached the arrangements for offering these seminars with special care. Since they had all conducted 
internal surveys o f their members’ experiences on a variety o f issues related to gender equality, the firms 
were able to identify some issues o f  special concern to be addressed by the programmes. The creation 
o f  an appropriate seminar required a good deal o f  energy and creative pedagogy in the context o f  highly 
sophisticated and articulate members o f  the profession - many o f  whom had never (or hardly ever) 
analyzed these issues before. After a period o f consultation with some firm lawyers, 1 designed a 
programme which could be presented to fifteen to twenty lawyers in an interactive seminar format, using 
both video problems and written materials on three aspects o f gender equality: issues about work 
assignment, performance assessment and promotion criteria and procedures; issues about the work 
environment, including problems o f  sexual harassment as well as issues about collegiality and client 
development; and issues about the relationship between work and family responsibilities. The seminar 
programme devoted about one-third of its time to discussion o f  each o f these three groups o f issues. For 
each group o f  issues, there was a short introduction, often providing an overview o f  legal principles 
(using an overhead projector), and an opportunity for questions or initial comments from participants. 
Each segment then turned to a short video presentation o f  some aspects o f the problem, and participants 
were asked to consider how to define the problems and the options for solutions along with their 
probable costs and consequences. In addition to the video problems, each segment also included 
analysis and discussion o f  written problems which demonstrated related, but somewhat different, aspects 
o f  the issues illustrated in the video problems. At the end o f all three segments, there was frequently 
time for only a brief conclusion, and participants were referred to written materials which were available 
for them to take away from the seminar for further reference. The three video segments used were 
produced in the United States: see “Further Adventures in Legal Ethics” (Professor S. Gillers, NYU Law 
School); and “All in a Day’s Work” (Ginzberg Video Productions, California). For an analysis o f the 
pedagogical challenges presented by these seminars, see Mossman, supra note 6.
to be “fit into” other, more important, pressures on them. In fact, it became 
increasingly clear that solutions to problems of gender inequality in legal practice 
could be addressed effectively only if they did not challenge the priority accorded to 
work demands, or if they could be easily accommodated within the prevailing law 
firm culture. Thus, to the extent that the literature suggests that gender equality goals 
may require major changes to practices and cultures, fundamental changes are 
unlikely to be adopted readily in law firms. Such a conclusion clearly limits the 
usefulness o f gender equality educational programmes, at least in terms of effective 
strategies for accomplishing substantive change in the legal profession.
Reflecting on Lawyers’ Work and the Practice o f Justice
As Margaret Thornton suggested in her analysis o f lawyers’ work in Australia, 
successful strategies for accomplishing change in the legal profession would have to 
confront the nature o f  legal work and the culture within which legal work is done, a 
context characterized by an increasing “corporatism” of law practice and by the 
“commodification” of lawyers.32 As Thornton suggested, law firm “corporatism” 
tends to undermine equality goals at the same time as they render gender invisible.33
32 Thomton also identified how both the nature o f legal work and law firms’ expectations have been 
changing in recent decades, exactly the same period in which women have begun to enter the legal 
profession in significant numbers:
...[WJhile acceptance o f women within legal practice is hailed as a sign o f progress, the 
dramatic changes that have occurred simultaneously in the structuring o f law firms have 
rendered the advances a pyrrhic victory. The lawyer in the modem corporate law firm is 
subject to disciplinary practices that are a far cry from the claimed independence and 
autonomy o f the past. The filling in o f time sheets and the need to generate specific levels o f  
income signify the most notorious manifestations o f control.... The focus on income 
generation, effected through the phenomenon o f billable hours, engenders a great deal o f  
ambivalence among women, as employed solicitors are expected to dedicate themselves 
totally to their careers and to the firm....Loyalty to the firm includes never complaining about 
its practices to an outside body....
Supra note 11 at 149-51.
See also M. Cain & C. Harrington, eds.. Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression 
(New York: New York University Press, 1994) at 2.
nSupra note 11 at 288-91. The inherent resistance to change in relation to gender equality goals within 
the legal profession was described in relation to the reports o f  Gender Bias Task Forces in the United 
States:
The powerful structures o f the law ... can even authorize inquiry, ask forbidden questions,
These insights about legal practice are important in the context of Ursula Franklin’s 
analysis o f the concept o f “asynchronicity” in relation to new technologies within the 
global community:
...while synchronicity evokes the presence o f sequences and patterns, fixed intervals 
or periodicities, coordination and synchronization, asynchronicity indicates the 
decoupling o f activities from their functional time or space patterns....The current 
widespread use o f computer networks...has led to... the prevalence o f asynchronicity, 
indicated by the loosening, if  not the abandonment, o f previously compulsory time 
and space patterns. This is a most significant change. No longer is one pattern 
superseded by another pattern; the change now appears as a move from an existing 
pattern to no discernable structure. I consider the evolving destructuring by 
asynchronicity as an extrem ely important, i f  not the crucial fa c e t  o f  the new  
electronic technologies. 34
For Franklin, the role o f asynchronicity in “unravelling social and political 
patterns” within workplaces is troubling. Instead of procedures which encourage 
engagement among workers, asynchronicity enables patterns of work and thinking 
which relentlessly undermine a sense o f community and responsibility. In this 
context, the features of lawyers’ work identified by Margaret Thornton reveal the 
impact o f asynchronicity in the practice of law:
• the adoption of billable hours in large law firms is not so much related to the 
product as it is to providing a means o f control over the work and lives of 
lawyers;
• the increasing specialization of legal work means that almost no one 
sees a transaction from beginning to end; as a result, there is a separation 
o f work being done from accountability/responsibility in terms of its 
goals or its overall impact;
obtain information, and still remain impenetrable to profound change. The fundamental 
accusation - oppression intrinsic in the delivery o f justice - remains beyond comprehension.
See J. Resnik, “Ambivalence: The Resiliency o f  Legal Culture in the United States” (1993)45 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1525 at 1535. See also E. Skordaki, “Glass Slippers and Glass Ceilings: Women in the Legal 
Profession” ( 1996) 3:1/2 International Journal o f  the Legal Profession 7; and J. Rosenberg, H. Perlstadt
& W. Phillips, “Now that We are Here: Discrimination, Disparagement, and Harassment at Work and 
the Experience o f Women Lawyers” (1993) 7:3 Gender and Society 415.
34 Supra note 1 at 151 [Emphasis added].
• legal work requires acceptance o f the normativity o f existing practices; 
there is no encouragement to challenge existing practices or to see 
things in new ways; and
• paid work is seen as the major focus of human activity and good 
lawyers are those who work the longest hours.35
In the context o f Thornton’s analysis, Touchstones acknowledged the existence 
o f workplace demands and argued36 that the emphasis on work should be tempered 
by the legal profession’s fundamental responsibility to promote equality as a matter 
o f justice. Challenging the idea that lawyers must respond fully to market demands, 
Touchstones argued that the legal profession must take seriously its public role, 
aspiring to meet the traditional ideal o f lawyers as “noble and learned,” and refuse 
to succumb to the role of “high priced technicians” who respond only to the needs 
o f the corporate elite. In this way, Touchstones ’ conception of the profession and 
its responsibility for justice challenged dominant ideas of the legal profession as 
market-driven and tending to corporatism and commodification, a voice which 
presented both challenge and resistance to the dominant discourse. Yet, in the 
context o f the profession as a “contested domain,”37 Touchstones articulated an
35 Supra note 11 at 75ff., argued that the impact o f  technocentrism on legal work and legal education was 
an “ideological desensitization,” citing Charles Derber’s insights about how legal practitioners are 
“absolved from ethical responsibility” when they serve dubious interests; according to Thornton, 
“technocentrism permits the normalization o f  property and profit-making enterprises” and similar views 
in relation to racism and sexism: C. Derber, Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced 
Capitalism (Boston: GK Hall & Co, 1982). Thornton suggested, moreover, that law students as well as 
legal practitioners may be affected by technocentrism:
Law students need to undergo a process o f  ideological desensitisation in preparation for 
practice. Hence, issues o f ethics and justice are likely to be given short shrift and to be treated 
as subordinate to mastery o f  technocratic rules. Derber reports that studies involving first-year 
students in a wide range o f professions, including law, reveal a rapid shift from a 
predominantly moral orientation to a technocratic one....
36 For example, see Touchstones, supra note 5 at 17:
The demands for gender fairness and equality are not the claims o f a special interest group.
They are legal and ethical issues o f  fairness and justice for the profession as a whole. They 
are not “women’s issues” but evidence o f a serious flaw in the structure and organization o f  
the profession.
37 Supra note 16 at 179.
alternative vision of justice without providing really effective strategies for 
implementing its vision in the practice o f  justice.
One concrete example in my seminars illustrates the limits o f the Touchstones 
analysis and the radical potential o f Franklin’s approach to the impact of 
technological change. In discussions in my seminars about the problem o f evening 
work, a frequent topic of discussion, the issue was usually presented as a question 
about the need for evening work; not surprisingly, most o f the time, lawyers in these 
major firms accepted that work during the evening was often essential. In the 
context o f our discussions, however, it became clear that both male and female 
lawyers who were the parents o f small children in practice left the firm about 6 p.m. 
in order to spend time with the children; and that by about 8:30 p.m., both male and 
female lawyers returned to work. Significantly, however, male lawyers, much more 
frequently than their female counterparts, physically returned to the law firms; 
whereas female lawyers were more likely to plug into a technological equivalent 
through a home computer system. Both males and females with small children 
frequently worked until midnight; however, it was only the male lawyers who were 
“visibly” at work at the firm late at night.38 As a result, it was often possible to have 
conversations about why male lawyers, who had increased “face” time at the firm, 
were thought to have worked harder than female lawyers, particularly when all o f 
these lawyers might well have all o f their work products completed by 8 a.m. on the 
following morning. Why, we pondered, was it so important for people to be 
physically present in the late evening at these firms?
Such questions raise a number of interesting issues. Certainly, in the context of 
the law firm seminars, it was possible to identify biases based on physical presence. 
Indeed, I often tried to promote the idea that the issue should be whether the work 
is done, and not the location in which work is done. Yet, this kind of solution may 
segregate workers from each other, and also from connections to their work, 
processes which reveal the substantial impact o f asynchronicity in law firms. By 
contrast, if  it is important to think about the need fo r  community in workplaces, 
physical presence may be necessary -  but even this conclusion does not really 
address whether people who regularly work more than ten or twelve hours each day 
have much energy to create a community, either during the day or in long evenings 
at work.
38 Indeed, compounding the gender equality issue, female lawyers sometimes indicated that their 
resistance to returning to the office was related to the lack o f  safety at night in underground parking 
garages in downtown Toronto, the location o f  most o f these large law firms.
In considering the issue o f long hours o f work in relation to gender equality, 
Touchstones offered recommendations which would permit women lawyers to 
undertake maternal responsibilities without penalty in terms of promotion to 
partnership.39 Not surprisingly, its recommendations were controversial, even 
though they were generally consistent with Canadian human rights legislation and 
jurisprudence. Yet, from the perspective of Franklin’s critique o f how technological 
change shapes human relationships and work places, the Touchstones 
recommendations were limited because they simply “fit gender” into existing 
workplace practices, rather than examining the more fundamental issues about the 
organization o f legal work, including the need for long hours. As Hilary Sommerlad 
argued, the social construction o f the lawyer’s job as one which demands full-time 
commitment and long hours of work is “central to the maintenance of the gendering 
o f the profession,”40 an arrangement which ensures that the “community” o f (mostly 
male) lawyers involved in late-night work is as privileged as it is gendered. In this 
way, the Touchstone recommendations also failed to challenge norms o f (male) 
individualism in legal culture to consider what a law firm would look like if it took 
seriously the idea o f a workplace community,41 “envisioning more humane ways of 
administering the entire justice system”42 and increasing access to it for the benefit 
o f everyone.
Thus, the law firm seminars demonstrated the limits o f the Touchstone
39 Supra note 5, recommended that law firms recognize the need for alternate work arrangements for all 
lawyers with parental responsibilities, including part-time partnerships (5:30); that law firms promote 
a more flexible model o f  career advancement in large law firms so that both partnership and firm 
structure can take into account the differing work histories o f  male and female lawyers (5:32); and that 
law firms establish alternate work arrangement policies that make restructured full time and reduced 
work options available to members o f the firm with parental responsibilities (5:33). More controversial 
were the report’s recommendations that law firms set realistic targets o f billable hours for women with 
child rearing responsibilities pursuant to their legal duty to accommodate (5: 18); and that law firms 
evaluate lawyers on a basis that gives due weight to the quality o f  time expended rather than exclusively 
to the quantity o f  time expended (5: 20).
40 H. Sommerlad, “The Myth o f  Feminization: Women and Cultural Change in the Legal Profession” 
(1994) 1:1 International Journal o f  the Legal Profession 31 at 39.
41 Some Canadian research concluded that lawyers work long hours because o f  internal commitments 
to work but also because o f  external work demands which are excessive; it was suggested that high rates 
o f  remuneration created a sense o f  obligation to work long hours. See J. E. Wallace, “It’s about Time: 
A Study o f  Hours Worked and Work Spillover among Law Firm Lawyers” (1997) 50 Journal o f  
Vocational Behavior 227.
42 S.O’Donovan-Polten, The Scales o f Success: Constructions o f  Life-Career Success o f  Eminent Men 
and Women Lawyers (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2001 ) at 200.
recommendations for gender equality educational programmes as a means of 
transforming the legal profession to achieve a different vision of justice. At the same 
time, however, both the recommendations and the seminars provided resistance to 
dominant voices o f a market-driven legal world. Moreover, in spite of the power of 
corporatism and commodification to silence other perspectives about human 
relationships, there is a need for resistant voices which imagine other ways of 
organizing the practice of law. Perhaps, especially for law teachers, there is a need 
to challenge the dominant paradigm, not just in forging a critical law school 
curriculum for LL.B. students, but also in working to challenge the dominant 
paradigms o f legal work within the profession so as to promote the practice o f  
justice. In such a context o f justice and technology, voices o f resistance need to 
understand “hope” not just as a goal, but more often as an active verb which 
requires renewed commitment and energy and which will often be experienced as 
a struggle. Yet, only by engaging in the struggle for hope can we respond 
meaningfully toUrsulaFranklin’s challenge: “Where, i f  not in school and workplace, 
is society built and changed? ”
